The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) has issued an alert warning of unauthorized remote access to video surveillance systems manufactured by Dahua.
“Cases of compromising IP cameras and DVRs with access to the video stream, changing the device configuration and creating third-party accounts have been recorded,” the State Special Communications Service of Ukraine (SSSCIP) said in an alert issued last week.
The primary initial access vector used in the attacks is via Easy4IP, a peer-to-peer (P2P) platform that allows users to remotely monitor homes or small businesses by connecting their Dahua IP cameras, NVRs, and DVRs via a smartphone app or web browser by scanning a QR code or entering the hardware Serial Number (SN).
The agency has warned that the serial numbers have a predictable structure containing a 10-character model prefix that’s identical for all units of the same device family and a five-character hexadecimal counter that’s incremented almost sequentially (e.g., 7K01F36PCA003E8).
This, in turn, allows attackers to guess them at scale through a brute-force attack and identify if they are connected to the cloud without hitting rate limits or lockouts. As a result, all devices with active P2P functionality are at risk even if they cannot be accessed directly via the internet.
“The assumption that the serial number is unknown to anyone is not a reason to consider the device secure,” CERT-UA said.
Authentication barriers are overcome by leveraging weak or known passwords, or by exploiting authentication bypass vulnerabilities in outdated firmware versions, such as CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045. CERT-UA has shared the following indicators of compromise associated with the activity –
- Presence of unknown accounts
- Unauthorized configuration changes
- Audit logs containing authentication events using the manufacturer’s native protocol (DVRIP) and from a local address (127.0.0.1), a sign of P2P access.
To counter the threat, it’s advised to disable the P2P feature if not required, avoid exposing them directly to the internet, and keep the software up-to-date.
The agency has not disclosed who was targeted, when these infections occurred, how many devices had been infected, or who was responsible for the activity. However, the findings share similarities with two clusters of activity that Hunt.io disclosed as targeting IP cameras in Ukraine and Russia.
One of the campaigns, attributed to a Russian-speaking operator, singled out internet-exposed cameras in Ukraine using known Dahua and Hikvision vulnerabilities, ultimately compromising 58 devices. The activity involved the exploitation of the following flaws by integrating Ingram, a publicly available webcam vulnerability scanner –
In parallel, the threat actor is also said to have undertaken scanning and exploitation of TP-Link and MikroTik routers and cameras using vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-53375 and CVE-2024-57049 across 15 European countries, including Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Moldova, Hungary, Czechia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the U.K., and Austria.
The second campaign, codenamed Operation CameraSwarm and attributed to a lone threat actor, is believed to have compromised over 14,530 Dahua IP cameras between June 17 and July 22, 2026, using a combination of credential brute-force attacks and the exploitation of the CVE-2021-33044-CVE-2021-33045 chain.
The attack scans for TCP port 37777, which is the default proprietary management and video streaming port used by Dahua, followed by collecting serial numbers, breaking into those devices by employing the aforementioned two exploitation methods, and then deploying a persistent backdoor account (“p2pwn / p2password”) on nearly 2,000 cameras in a manner that can survive password change and a factory reset.
“1,923 cameras carry a persistent backdoor account (p2pwn / p2password), installed over RPC after either bypass,” Hunt.io noted at the time. “It is stored independently of the admin password and survives a password change and, on most firmware, a factory reset. 283 cameras were reached by serial number alone through Dahua’s cloud relay, with no device address and, in most cases, no credentials.”
In some instances, the attackers have been found to abuse Dahua’s cloud relay to reach cameras behind NATs using only their serial numbers.
Earlier this year, Dutch intelligence agencies warned that Russian actors are compromising IP cameras across the E.U., NATO states, and Ukraine to conduct systematic digital espionage operations and acquire military intelligence.
“This actor performs automated analysis of imagery through image recognition software to conduct targeted searches for military vehicles and the military cargo they are transporting,” the July 2026 bulletin said.
“This provides the actor with, among other things, relevant military data, such as E.U. and NATO military transport routes, weapon deliveries to Ukraine, and the locations of Ukrainian military personnel. The information from IP cameras in Ukraine is used in attempts to neutralize Ukrainian military personnel and to destroy their military material.”
